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Abstract 
Passenger vehicles and power plants are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions. While 
economic analyses generally indicate that a broader market-based approach to greenhouse 
gas reduction would be less costly and more effective, regulatory approaches have found 
greater political success. Vehicle efficiency standards have a long history in the U.S and 
elsewhere, and the recent success of shale gas in the U.S. leads to a focus on coal–gas fuel 
switching as a way to reduce power sector emissions. We evaluate a global regulatory 
regime that replaces coal with natural gas in the electricity sector and imposes technically 
achievable improvements in the efficiency of personal transport vehicles. Its performance 
and cost are compared with other scenarios of future policy development including a no-
policy world, achievements under the Copenhagen accord, and a price-based policy to 
reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050. The assumed regulations applied globally achieve 
a global emissions reduction larger than projected for the Copenhagen agreements, but they 
do not prevent global GHG emissions from continuing to grow, and the reduction in 
emissions is achieved at a high cost compared to a price-based policy. Diagnosis of the 
reasons for the limited yet high-cost performance reveals influences including the partial 
coverage of emitting sectors, small or no influence on the demand for emissions-intensive 
products, leakage when a reduction in fossil use in the covered sectors lowers the price to 
others, and the partial coverage of GHGs. 
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1. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO GHG EMISSIONS CONTROL 
1.1 The Push for Regulation 
Most quantitative studies of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions assume 
some form of price-based policy that is imposed either by a tax or a cap-and-trade system (e.g., 
Kriegler et al., 2013; Paltsev et al., 2013; van Vuuren et al, 2011; Clarke et al., 2009) This policy 
choice is motivated in part by the ease of simulating these measures in computer models, but 
more importantly a price-based approach is widely seen as a low-cost means of achieving 
emissions reduction targets. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few local or regional 
examples,
1
 progress in developing a price-based approach has faltered. Instead, governments are 
turning ever more frequently to familiar instruments for environmental control: regulations and 
subsidies.  
The U.S. provides an example of the process. The Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade legislation 
passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 but failed in the Senate, and this measure is no 
longer seriously under consideration in the U.S. Various proposals have come forth for a carbon 
or greenhouse gas tax, most recently the Climate Protection Act of 2013 (U.S. Senate, 2013), but 
prospects for serious consideration of a new tax are poor. Instead, a number of regulatory 
measures have been imposed, and others are under consideration—to be added to regulatory and 
subsidy programs already in place.  
Moreover, even where taxes or trading systems have been adopted they usually are 
supplemented by regulatory measures. The European Trading System (ETS) is an example. It 
applies only to about half of Europe’s emissions, leaving a combination of regulations and 
subsidies as the policies of choice in other sectors. Even where the ETS applies, overlapping 
regulatory targets are in place for renewable power generation and efficiency improvement. In 
addition, regulatory measures of the type explored here are proposed as part of a possible 
sectoral approach to an international agreement on emissions reduction (Sawa, 2010; Gavard et 
al., 2011). 
Because electric power generation and personal transportation contribute a large fraction of 
anthropogenic GHGs, and technical means are available for lowering their emissions, these two 
sectors are an attractive target for further regulatory action. To some degree such a move is 
already underway. In the U.S. the shale gas bonanza has generated excitement about the 
possibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by shifting from coal to gas for power 
generation. Spurred by falling gas prices, a redispatch of existing generation units led to a drop in 
coal generation from 50% to 42% of U.S. generation over the period 2005 to 2011, to be largely 
replaced by less CO2-intensive natural gas, which rose from 19% to 25% of the national total. 
Studies of potential future growth of U.S. natural gas production suggest that further replacement 
of coal with gas in electric generation could be a large part of a program to further reduce U.S. 
                                                 
1
 These include experimentation with carbon taxes in several countries (Carbon Tax Center, 2013) and cap-and-trade 
systems including the European Trading System (ETS), a California implementation and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern U.S. 
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GHGs even taking account of leakage of methane from the natural gas supply system (MITEI, 
2012; Jacoby et al., 2012). Because shale resources are widely distributed internationally, the 
U.S. experience has ignited interest elsewhere in such a fuel shift in the electric sector.  
Passenger vehicles are viewed as an important target for climate policy around the world. 
Many governments have increased the stringency of future new vehicle fuel economy (or 
equivalent per distance emissions) standards to unprecedented high levels within the last decade. 
Fuel economy standards target reductions in vehicle fuel use or emissions per unit of distance 
traveled. These standards apply only to new vehicles, and do not constrain the total quantity of 
fuel use or emissions. Among the adopting regions, the EU and the U.S. have enacted some of 
the toughest standards. The latest U.S. fuel economy standards would raise the combined city-
highway test-cycle fuel economy from around 27.5 mpg in 2007 to around 48 mpg (or 163 
grams/mile) in 2025 (combined for cars and light trucks). Policymakers claim that relative to 
new vehicles produced in 2016, the 2017–2025 rule will reduce U.S. oil consumption by 4 
billion barrels of oil and CO2 emissions by 1.8 billion metric tons over the lifetimes of model 
year 2017 to 2025 vehicles (U.S. EPA, 2013). China, Korea, Canada, India, Japan and Australia 
also have fuel economy standards in place. The objective of this analysis is to investigate the 
economic, energy and environmental implications of a regulatory approach to emissions 
mitigation that focuses the substitution of gas for coal in power generation and raises vehicle 
efficiency. We explore the implications of advances that have been put forth as technically 
feasible, near-term policies on the assumption they are extended to global application. How 
would such an approach contribute to the goal of reducing climate change risk, and at what cost? 
Achievements under such a regulatory approach are compared to those under other potential 
futures including scenarios of the continuation of current policies, and the adoption of a global 
target achieved with a universal price on greenhouse gas emissions, and the adoption of 
regulatory measures in the interest of short term response to be supplemented later by a price-
based regime.  
1.2 A Regulatory Scenario and Alternatives 
To explore a regulatory approach to global GHG reduction we construct a case where controls 
are imposed on both electric power generation and personal transport. In the electricity sector we 
assume that regulations are imposed that replace all oil and coal with natural gas in every region 
by 2050, on a linear path from 2010. In the personal transport sector the national vehicle fleets of 
new personal transport vehicles are required, also by 2050, to improve their miles-per-gallon 
(MPG) performance from their 2010 standard to the level shown in Table 1. This path for 
automotive design leads to an average for the global on-the-road fleet rising from 23 MPG in 
2010 to 43 MPG in 2050. This advance is assumed to be achieved by a combination of 
improvements in gasoline and diesel vehicle efficiency, penetration of hybrid, plug-in and pure 
electric vehicles, and addition of biofuels into the fuel mix. Low-carbon second-generation 
biofuels are assumed to be available, only limited by cost. It is further assumed that no emissions 
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control measures beyond those already committed are taken in other economic sectors such as air, 
rail and truck transport, industry, commerce, agriculture or households. 
Table 1. New fleet vehicle efficiency standard in miles per gallon (MPG). 
  2010 2050 
USA 28 80 
Canada 29 80 
Mexico 20 60 
Brazil 20 60 
Rest of Americas 20 55 
Europe 45 100 
Russia 20 55 
Rest of Europe & Central Asia 20 55 
China 35 85 
India 24 70 
Japan 43 80 
Dynamic Asia 37 80 
Rest of East Asia 20 60 
Australia and Oceana 27 80 
Middle East 20 70 
Africa 20 60 
Termed the Regulations Scenario, the effectiveness and cost of a regime based on the 
previously described measures is compared with four alternative futures: 
 No Policy Scenario. No greenhouse gas control measures are taken by the nations 
beyond those in place before the Copenhagen Agreement.
2
 
 MIT Copenhagen Scenario. Nations are assumed to meet the emissions reductions to 
2020 pledged under the agreement reached in the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference 
of Parties (COP) of the Climate Convention and confirmed in the subsequent COP in 
Cancun, as modeled by the MIT Joint Program, with these targets extended to 2050.
3
 
This scenario is the basis for the 2012 MIT Outlook (MIT Joint Program, 2012).  
 Least Cost Scenario. A policy is adopted by all nations that takes effect beginning in 
2015, set to achieve a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below the 2000 level 
by 2050. It is modeled as achieved by a price measure—e.g., by a CO2 tax or cap-and-
                                                 
2
 Several nations that earlier made emissions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have since backed out of the 
agreement, and the base year of the simulations accounts for any achievement the early years of the 2008-2012 
Kyoto commitment period, so ultimate reductions under the Protocol are not specifically included in the 
simulations. 
3
 Although China’s Copenhagen intensity target is in terms of CO2, it is modeled in these simulations as a GHG 
commitment.  
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trade system applied uniformly across all sectors and nations (with revenues rebated to 
households in each region).
4
 
 Combined Scenario. The Least Cost Scenario is employed in sequence with the 
Regulations Scenario. 
This regulatory approach to emissions control and the other scenarios considered for 
comparison are assessed without regard to current political likelihood, but the analysis does 
consider practical supply issues such as biomass resource availability, vehicle turnover times, 
delays in infrastructure development, etc.  
The environmental performance of all but the last of these scenarios, and the cost of the 
Regulations compared to the Least Cost Scenario, are considered in Section 2, and the limitations 
of the regulatory approach are diagnosed in Section 3. In Section 4 we consider the possibility of 
sequential policy development, formulating under which the Combined Scenario employs both 
the assumed Regulations Scenario and the Least Cost Scenario. 
1.3 Analysis Method 
Assessment of the performance of the Regulations Scenario and alternatives needs to take 
account of the interaction of the electricity and transport sectors with other components of the 
energy sector and with other parts of the economy, and for this purpose we apply the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005). EPPA is a 
recursive–dynamic multiregional general equilibrium model of the world economy—divided into 
16 nations and multination regions—which is built on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
data set of world economic activity augmented by data on the emissions of greenhouse gases, 
aerosols and other relevant species, and details of selected economic sectors. The model is used 
to study global population and economic growth, technology development and energy use, and to 
project greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and prepare assessments of GHG control policies both 
for individual countries and for proposed international agreements (Paltsev et al., 2005).  
The model projects economic variables (gross domestic product, energy use, sectoral output, 
consumption, etc.) and emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) 
and other air pollutants (CO, VOC, NOx, SO2, NH3, black carbon and organic carbon) from the 
supply and combustion of carbon-based fuels, industrial processes, waste handling and 
agricultural activities. The model identifies sectors that produce and convert energy, industrial 
sectors that use energy and produce other goods and services, and the various sectors that 
consume goods and services (including both energy and non-energy). The model covers all 
economic activities and tracks domestic use and international trade. Energy production and 
conversion sectors include coal, oil, and gas production, petroleum refining and an extensive set 
of alternative low-carbon and carbon-free generation technologies. The regional and sectoral 
breakdown of the version of the EPPA model applied here are shown in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
4
 In this assumed burden sharing the developed regions include the U.S., Canada, Japan, EU, Russia, Australia and 
New Zealand.  
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Table 2. Structure of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis Model  
Countries/Regions Sectors  
United States 
Canada 
Japan 
European Union+a 
Australia/New Zealand 
Russia 
Rest of Europe 
India  
China 
Dynamic East Asiab 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Central and S. America 
Middle East 
Africa 
Rest of World 
 
Non-Energy 
Crops 
Livestock 
Forestry 
Food 
Services 
Energy-Intensive Products 
Other Industries Products 
Industrial Transportation 
Household Transportation 
     Purchased Transportation 
 Internal Combustion Vehicles 
 Conventional Hybrid Vehicles 
 Plug-in Electric Vehicles 
 Electric Vehicles  
 
 
Energy 
Coal 
Crude Oil 
Oil from Shale 
Refined Oil 
Liquid Fuel from Biomass 
Natural Gas 
Synthetic Gas from Coal 
Electricity Generation Tech. 
  Conventional Fossil 
  Hydro 
  Nuclear 
  Advanced 
  Biomass (BELE) 
  Natural Gas Combined  
    Cycle 
  NGCC with CCS 
  Coal with CCS 
  Solar and Wind 
  Wind with NG backup 
  Wind with Biomass backup 
aThe European Union (EU-27) plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
bIncluding South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Importantly for this study, account is taken of the fugitive emissions of methane from its 
supply and use system. Emissions rates, taken from the Edgar data base, differ among regions, 
but the global average is about 4% of produced natural gas (Waugh et al., 2011).  
For analysis of the implications of these policy scenarios for atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations and climate change the EPPA model is integrated into the MIT Integrated Global 
System (IGSM) framework (Sokolov et al., 2005). The analysis covers the greenhouse gases 
specified in the Kyoto Protocol (CO2, methane, nitrous oxide and a set of industrial gases). For 
purposes of economic analysis within the EPPA model, the marginal cost abatement for different 
GHGs are valued based on their 100-year Global Warming Potentials as defined by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IGSM explicitly treats the fate of emissions 
once in the atmosphere and the radiative forcing of each substance separately. Details of the 
IGSM and its EPPA component, and their application to issues of climate risk and policy 
development can be found at http://globalchange.mit.edu/. 
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2. PERFORMANCE AND COST OF INDEPENDENT ALTERNATIVES 
2.1 Emissions and Climate Impact 
2.1.1 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
Figure 1 shows the projection of global GHG emissions in CO2 equivalents (CO2-e) under 
four of the policy scenarios. The Copenhagen Agreement stabilizes emissions out to its 2020 
terminal date, but since the commitments of several developing countries are stated in terms of 
emissions intensity (GHG per unit of GDP) extension of the agreement to 2050 yields continued 
emissions growth. The Regulations Scenario delivers more substantial reductions than MIT 
Copenhagen, but these measures are not sufficient to avoid continuing growth in global 
emissions. Also, in 2050 the Regulations Scenario cuts global emissions by only about one-third 
of the reduction achieved by the Least Cost Scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Global greenhouse gas emissions under alternative policies. 
 
Figure 2 shows where among the economic sectors of the U.S., EU and China the main coal-
to-gas substitution occurs under the Regulations Scenario, compared with conditions under the 
MIT Copenhagen and the Least Cost scenarios. Compared to the U.S. and Europe, China shows 
its highest increase in gas use under the Regulations Scenario, which comes in its power 
generation sector. In part this result is attributable to the fact that in 2010 coal in China 
accounted for a higher share of electricity generation (almost three-quarters) than in either the 
U.S. (around 45%) or Europe (about a quarter). The faster economic growth in China also 
generates a higher increase in gas consumption compared to other regions. Under the MIT 
Copenhagen Scenario and the Least Cost Scenario, on the other hand, China’s gas use grows less 
strongly or even declines. 
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Figure 2. Gas use by region under alternative policies. 
Figure 3 shows how the emissions reduction is achieved in personal transport under the 
Regulations Scenario and the Least Cost Scenario. (Note that the total emission reduction is 
much greater under Least Cost, as shown in Figure 1.) Plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs) do not 
play a significant role under either policy because their costs are higher than alternatives. Indeed, 
under the cost assumptions applied here, hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) outcompete PHEVs or 
pure electrics (EVs), delivering the required vehicle efficiency standards at lower cost.  
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Figure 3. Fuel efficiency standards and personal vehicle demand under Least Cost 
compared to the Regulations Scenario. 
 
Given the substantial CO2 reductions that the Regulations Scenario requires in electricity and 
transport, which are two large emitting sectors, a greater impact on global total emissions might 
be expected than that shown in Figure 1. In Section 3 we explore the reasons for this weak 
performance at the all-sector, global scale. 
2.1.2 Effect on Projected Climate Change  
The emissions projections in Figure 1 are analyzed using the climate science component of 
the MIT Integrated Global System Model (Sokolov et al., 2005), which contains a detailed 
representation of the carbon cycle and the chemistry of the other greenhouse gases, to explore the 
effect of these different scenarios on projected climate change. One step in this analysis is a 
calculation of the atmospheric GHG concentrations under the various policy scenarios. These are 
presented in Figure 4. The different GHGs are aggregated in terms of their instantaneous effect 
on the Earth’s radiation balance, so their overall effect is stated in terms of CO2-eq, which in this 
measure is the CO2 concentration that would have the same instantaneous effect as all the gases 
together.
5
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 This a different definition of CO2-eq then that defined by global-warming potentials. The GWP measure is widely 
used for policy formulation applied to emissions. It adjusts instantaneous radiative forcing based on different 
lifetimes of gases. The definition used here is based on instantaneous radiative forcing given actual 
concentrations at any given point in time. It more accurately reflects the effect on climate at any given point in 
time.  
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Figure 4. Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations under alternative policy assumptions. 
 
Note that the MIT Copenhagen and No Policy scenarios produce essentially the same 
outcome. In these two scenarios, and under the Regulations Scenario, the human emissions rate 
exceeds the rate of uptake by the oceans and biosphere throughout the period, so atmospheric 
concentrations continue to rise. By 2050 the Regulations Scenario reduces the concentration by 
only about 50 ppm below the MIT Copenhagen Scenario. The 50% reduction in global emissions 
in the Least Cost Scenario is projected to be aggressive enough to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations at around 500 ppm. 
The effect of these emissions scenarios on projected global temperature increase relative to its 
preindustrial level is shown in Figure 5. The effects on global temperature of the Regulations 
Scenario, or even of the 50% Least Cost target, are much less substantial than the emissions 
reductions (Figure 1), or even of the change in atmospheric GHG concentrations (Figure 4). The 
smaller effect occurs for several reasons. Most important is the inertia in the climate system. 
Because of the heat uptake by the ocean, the climate system is still adjusting to emissions from 
before the 1990 start of the climate simulation and their addition to concentrations. Also, because 
the simulation period extends only to 2050, the full effect of the Regulations Scenario, in relation 
to a MIT Copenhagen or a No Policy world, has not been realized. If the simulation was 
extended to later decades in the century the projected temperature reduction attributed to the 
Regulations Scenario would be greater. 
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Figure 5. Global temperature relative to preindustrial level under alternative global policy 
scenarios. 
Also significant in the temperature result in Figure 5 is the influence of aerosols, which are 
not taken into account in Figures 1 and 4. To simplify somewhat, aerosols come in two forms: 
black and white. Reducing coal use reduces the emissions of black aerosols, another warming 
agent, but also reduces the emissions of sulfur compounds. The sulfur emissions are the 
precursors of white or reflecting aerosols, which are a cooling influence. With the sharp cut in 
coal burning in the Regulations Scenario the loss of reflecting aerosols is the larger influence.  
The 50% global reduction in emission under the Least Cost Scenario is sufficient to bring the 
path of increasing global temperature by midcentury into a zone that is consistent with the 
maintenance of the target of a 2°C limit above its pre-industrial level. However, temperature is 
still rising, and so maintaining that goal will depend on further cuts beyond 2050, enough to 
counter remaining inertia in the system. 
2.2 Cost Effectiveness 
A price-based policy will, in general, yield emissions reductions at a cost lower than a 
collection of regulatory measures, and comparison with the performance of a universal price 
penalty on GHG emissions is an extremely tough test for the assumed Regulations Scenario. Still, 
exploration of this difference can help inform judgments about the design of regulatory measures 
and how they might be improved.  
Comparing the cost of reductions achieved in the Regulations vs. the Least Cost scenarios is 
not straightforward, however. For a least cost solution based on market approach there is a single 
price of GHGs, which is a cost of reduction at the margin. This price rises with increasing 
stringency of the policy; for example, in the least cost scenario with international emissions 
trading considered here global carbon price reaches around $75/t CO2-e in 2030 and around 
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$500–600/t by 2050. Because the Regulations Scenario involves several policies, each with its 
own cost at the margin, there is no single price or marginal cost. It is possible, however, to 
calculate the average cost of the Regulations Scenario, to be compared with the average cost of 
the Least Cost Scenario. One measure of the cost of emissions mitigation is the loss in national 
consumption, which is related to the change in gross domestic product but is a better measure of 
the welfare effect of policy. Using this definition of cost the average cost of emissions reduction 
is computed by simply dividing the global cost in each year by the tons of CO2 equivalent 
reduction below that of the MIT Copenhagen Scenario. 
Figure 6 presents this result for the Regulations and the Least Cost scenarios. As expected, 
the results show the Regulations Scenario to be a relatively expensive approach to emissions 
reduction. Throughout the period to 2050 they impose a higher average cost per ton reduced than 
does the price-based policy. It is worth reiterating that the price per ton CO2-e of the Least Cost 
Scenario, which reflects the marginal cost of reduction, is substantially higher than the average 
cost plotted in the figure. The price reflects the cost of the most expensive actions required to 
achieve each year’s reduction, but of course many mitigation actions are less costly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average cost of greenhouse reduction, Regulations Scenario and the Least Cost 
Scenario. 
 
This difference in average cost of emissions reduction can be attributed to several features of 
a regulatory approach, as compared to imposition of a uniform financial penalty on emissions. A 
main cause of the high Regulations Scenario cost is the effect of the very stringent vehicle 
efficiency standards laid out in Table 1, with a strong contribution to the global cost from regions 
such as the U.S. and Europe that face a combination of large vehicle fleets and very great 
increases in MPG, as well as from countries with rapidly growing vehicle markets, such as 
China. On a global average, the realized miles per gallon (MPG) are increasing from 23 MPG in 
2010 to 43 MPG in 2050 in the Regulations Scenario. Increasing fuel efficiency standards in this 
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way raises average vehicle costs. The corresponding number in 2050 under MIT Copenhagen is 
26 MPG, while the Least Cost Scenario reaches only 32 MPG in 2050.  
In 2050, average MPGs in the Regulations Scenario are 38 in China, 33.5 in India, 64 in 
Europe, and 51 in the U.S. The corresponding numbers under the Least Cost Scenario are 24.5 in 
China, 28.5 in India, 47 in Europe, and 34 in U.S. The resulting changes in vehicles per capita 
and total vehicles in these scenarios are plotted in Figure 12, which shows the developing 
countries to be most sensitive to the cost increase. This difference between the developed and 
developing nations emerges because the cost of increased vehicle efficiency is the same across 
regions, but the vehicle cost before the increase in fuel efficiency requirement is lower in 
developing countries. Thus, the percentage increase in vehicle price to meet the efficiency 
standards is higher in developing countries than in developed ones. For the same reason, Figure 
12 shows that the total personal vehicle numbers in developing countries are more sensitive to 
the fuel efficiency standards required by the Regulations Scenario, even though their total 
vehicle fleets will increase significantly over the decades to 2050. 
Despite the fact that MPG increases are more modest in China, efficiency increases result in 
significant additional new vehicle costs in a highly price-sensitive market, significantly limiting 
new vehicle purchases in the Regulations Scenario as households substitute toward other 
transport modes in future years. Thus in China vehicle ownership rates are reduced relative to the 
MIT Copenhagen Scenario and, though this change brings less expenditure on vehicles and fuel, 
an economic model like EPPA values the loss of mobility and the cost of substituting other forms 
of transport. 
3. DIAGNOSIS OF THE REGULATORY APPROACH 
The regulatory approach as framed here does not achieve frequently mentioned emissions 
targets, or the 2 
°
C temperature targets shown in Figure 5. Moreover,the emissions reduction that 
it does achieve comes at substantially higher cost than would be the case with a price-based 
approach. Factors that contribute to these differences in performance and cost can be 
summarized as follows. 
3.1 Emissions From Outside Electricity and Personal Transport 
For three of the policy scenarios Figure 7 shows CO2 emissions by consuming sector. The 
reduction in emissions of the Regulations and Least Cost scenarios are presented in relation to 
emissions under MIT Copenhagen. Here can be seen one main reason why the Least Cost 
approach is so much less costly than emissions mitigation by the Regulations Scenario. Under 
the Regulations Scenario almost all of the reductions come from limiting the increase in CO2 
emissions from the two targeted sectors, electricity and personal transport. Therefore this limited 
regulatory approach misses lower cost reductions in other sectors, and reduction in other 
greenhouse gases, that a price-based policy exploits. Particularly important for this cost-saving 
effect are the reductions in in the industry, household and commercial transport sectors which 
allow the very high cost of the ambitious targets for automobile technology and biofuels to be 
avoided. 
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Figure 7. Scenarios of emissions reduction.  
3.2 Limited Incentives in the Electric Sector  
Even in the targeted electric sector, the Regulations Scenario fails to take advantage of 
potential emissions reductions. The various options are shown in Figure 8, which plots global 
generation in terawatt-hours by technology, again showing the demand reduction in relation to 
conditions under the MIT Copenhagen Scenario. The Regulations Scenario replace coal with 
natural gas, and the resulting increase in electricity price yields a small reduction in electricity 
demand. The price-based approach on the other hand not only replaces coal with gas but also 
increases the use of renewables and nuclear power and takes advantage of cost-efficient 
reductions in electricity demand. Late in the period the ever more stringent reduction target in the 
Least Cost Scenario lead to the phase-out of gas without capture and the introduction of 
relatively expensive gas generation with capture and storage. Even though the costs at the margin 
are high in these later years the many reductions are being achieved by (intra-marginal) lower 
cost actions, leading to the average cost plotted in Figure 6.  
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Figure 8. Electricity generation by fuel type. 
3.3 Expansion of Use of Coal Outside the Electric Sector 
The Regulations Scenario focuses on coal in the electric sector, and in some countries like the 
U.S. this limited target in fact covers something over four-fifths of coal use. But this use pattern 
is not universal. For example, as shown in Figure 9 only about half of China’s coal use is in the 
electric sector, and other uses are free to grow with no restraining incentives.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. China’s coal use by sector, 2010 (China Energy Yearbook, 2011). 
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Therefore, the partial coverage of coal use has a perverse effect illustrated in Figure 10. In 
China the elimination of coal in electricity generation lowers the coal price, stimulating its use in 
the Industry and Residential sectors, as shown in the left-hand side of the figure. The application 
of a universal emissions price reduces coal use in these sectors as well as in electric power. 
Under the Regulations Scenario, the partial coverage of coal use and the associated coal leakage 
lead to reductions in coal use in the U.S. and other developed counties, but to increases in China 
and India as shown on the right-hand side of the figure.  
Figure 10. Projected coal use in 2050 by sector and region. 
3.4 Limited Coverage of the Transport Sector 
The cost-increasing effect of partial coverage also appears in the transport sector, whose oil 
use is shown in Figure 11. By 2050 the Regulations Scenario accomplishes a substantial 
reduction in oil use in personal vehicles, in relation to the MIT Copenhagen Scenario. This 
reduction reflects both the effect of the programmed increase in vehicle efficiency and the 
“rebound” effect whereby the lower cost per mile of a more efficient vehicle leads to additional 
miles driven. But note that oil use in commercial vehicles (trucks, buses, trains, airplanes and 
ships) continues to grow apace, with no reduction below the levels under the less stringent MIT 
Copenhagen Scenario. 
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Figure 11. Fuel use in the global vehicle fleet. 
 
On the other hand, the price-based measure applied in the Least Cost Scenario provides 
incentives both to improve vehicle efficiency and to reduce miles driven or ton-miles, leading a 
reduction in fuel use (and thus in emissions) for all components of the transport sector. Fuel use 
by personal vehicles in 2030 is higher in the Least Cost Scenario than in assumed the 
Regulations Scenario, indicating that the regulatory approach is forcing higher efficiency 
vehicles into the market much earlier than is needed for the least cost approach, again 
contributing to the higher cost of this policy. Under the Least Cost Scenario opportunities are 
exploited for emission reductions that are cheaper than the very stringent vehicle standards that 
are assumed in the Regulations Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of personal vehicle use. 
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4. SEQUENTIAL POLICY DEVLOPMENT 
The Regulations Scenario could serve as a pragmatic policy strategy for emissions reductions 
in a circumstance where lower-cost approaches, with wider coverage of sectors, are either not 
feasible or only likely to be implemented at some point in the future. It is useful, therefore, to 
consider the implications of a combined approach wherein both of these policies are eventually 
put into effect on a global scale. To explore this possibility we impose the Regulations Scenario 
beginning in 2010 and then initiate the Least Cost target, with its first influence felt in 2015.  
The results in terms of cost per ton of CO2-equivalent reduced are shown in Figure 13, which 
also shows the cost curves for the Regulations and Least Cost approaches if pursued 
independently (as in Figure 6). If the two policies are implemented in sequence the cost per ton 
reduced is higher than the Least Cost approach in the early years, but over time two phenomena, 
one in the electric sector and one in transport, combine to yield an average cost of the 
combination that is only slightly above the cost of the Least Cost Scenario. In the electric sector 
the rising emissions price in the Least Cost Scenario soon begins to drive coal from the 
generation mix (see Figure 8) and so supersedes the effect of the regulatory constraint on coal 
use. On the transport side, the high cost of the tightened vehicle standards (which yield a high 
average cost when applied alone and the quantity reduced is small) now spread across the much 
larger CO2-eq quantity when the reduction is 50% of the 2000 level. The higher cost of the auto 
standards is still felt, but its impact on average cost is greatly diluted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Cost of Regulations, Least Cost and Combined policies. 
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Scenario, by forcing earlier adoption of advanced vehicle technology, lowers vehicle costs in 
later years compared with the Least Cost Scenario. However, this advantage comes at a much 
higher cost in earlier years.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
While analysts concerned with national cost of GHG control have long advocated a GHG 
pricing policy, by a cap–and–trade system or a tax, covering all emissions sources and gases, 
governments more often pursue sectoral policies and technology standards. Given these political 
realities, the Regulations Scenario represents a more politically practical approach to GHG 
reductions, focusing on solutions that are within reach and that do not depend on technological 
breakthroughs. Assessment of such an approach requires an economy-wide analysis framework 
as applied here, and the results of our analysis of the performance of a regulatory approach as 
formulated here, compared to alternative policies, can be summarized in five points: 
 The Regulations Scenario could achieve substantial reductions in GHG emissions in two 
important sectors, electricity and personal transportation. These achievements yield a 
global reduction larger than projected for the Copenhagen Agreement. They would not, 
however, prevent global GHG emissions from continuing to grow over the decades to 
2050.  
 The main reasons why the Regulations Scenario does not yield larger global 
accomplishments are:  
 The partial coverage of emitting sectors of the economy,  
 The only small influence on the demand for emissions-intensive products by the 
economy as a whole and even within the covered sectors (e.g., demand for 
electricity, and miles or ton-miles traveled),  
 The leakage when reduction in fossil use in the covered sectors increases energy 
use and emissions on other sectors, and  
 The partial coverage of GHGs: a focus on CO2 and no explicit downward 
pressure on the other gases. 
 The regulatory approach in electricity and personal transport, as formulated here, 
involves significantly greater average cost per ton of CO2 reduction than does a policy 
that applies a common penalty across all GHG emissions. 
 If the Regulations Scenario is imposed as a way to get started on larger emissions 
reductions, and then combined with a broader GHG pricing policy pursuing a deep global 
cut in emissions, its requirements will eventually be overtaken by the pricing policy. 
Remaining higher costs of the regulatory targets become diluted so that in later years the 
difference in average cost per ton between a least cost approach and one preceded by a 
period of regulatory action becomes very small. 
These results suggest a wider range of possibilities that could be considered in anticipation of 
any program of GHG regulations. For example, efficiency measures could be introduced for a 
full range of commercial transport modes, and gas substitution for oil and coal could be extended 
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to industrial uses and residential settings. Also, the potential role of renewable energy (wind, 
solar and biomass) and nuclear energy under different cost and engineering assumptions was not 
fully considered in these simulations. Finally, a broader range of least-cost instruments could be 
considered, for instance by undertaking a combination of a carbon tax and emissions trading 
system in some sectors (e.g., electric power) with regulatory provisions in others. 
In moving from the present analysis to examination of a broader range of sectors, sensitivities, 
and policy designs, however, continued attention would need be devoted to the important drivers 
of results that emerged in this study—i.e. the rebound effect incentivized by efficiency gains, 
leakage of emissions to uncovered sectors, and the interactions of policy with the relative size 
and features of regional markets. 
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